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I. INTRODUCTION
Although this survey period did not have any single “blockbuster”
development for franchise and distribution case law in Texas, a number of cases
were decided on very frequently litigated issues in franchising, including liability
and appropriate remedies for Lanham Act violations, the proper construction of
franchise agreements with multiple amendments, vicarious liability, and the
definition of “consumer” under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. In
addition, this survey period saw a bankruptcy court analyze an interesting choice
of law issue, perfectly highlighting the potentially dispositive difference that
critical issue may make. Another court, in an opinion analyzing something as
mundane as a dispute over the proper breadth of discovery, provides guidance
for analyzing very contentious issues in franchise litigation, such as the extent to
which information from non-party franchisees is discoverable. Taken as a whole,
this survey period produced several decisions which have the potential to
become frequently cited cases in Texas franchise law.
II. PROCEDURE
A. CHOICE OF LAW
A very interesting choice of law decision came out of the bankruptcy court in
Allegra Network, LLC v. Ruth (In re Ruth). 1 The Allegra proceeding arose out of the
bankruptcy filing of an Insty-Prints franchisee in Texarkana. 2 Prior to the
bankruptcy filing, the franchisee had been in the Insty-Prints system since 1984. 3
The original franchise agreement was renewed several times, and after the first
renewal, the original franchisor assigned its rights under the franchise agreement
to a successor franchisor, Allegra.4 When the time came to renew the franchise
again, the second renewal, signed in 2006, contained a choice of law clause
specifying the application of Michigan law. 5 The original franchisor was based in
Minnesota. 6 Eventually, Allegra brought suit against the franchisee for past-due
royalties and to enforce the covenant not to compete in the franchise
1. Allegra Network LLC v. Ruth, Ch. 13 Case No. 10-50184, Adv. No. 10-5009, 2013 WL
139265 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2013).
2. Id. at *2.
3. Id. at *1.
4. Id. at *2.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *1.
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agreement. 7 The franchisee then filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. 8
The specific issue the Allegra opinion addresses is whether the covenant not to
compete found in the 1984 franchise agreement was enforceable. 9 It turns out
that the Michigan choice of law provision inserted into the second franchise
agreement renewal in 2006 was determinative of that question. 10 In the
litigation, Allegra “insiste[d] upon the application of Michigan law to interpret
the viability of this and other covenants contained within the Franchise
Agreement.” 11 However, the bankruptcy court noted that a Michigan statute
repealed in 1985 declared that any covenant not to compete was deemed illegal
and void. 12 The court cited multiple Michigan cases holding that any covenant
entered into prior to the statute’s repeal remained unenforceable. 13 The court
analyzed the renewals to the franchise agreement, found that they constituted
mere extensions to the original 1984 agreement as opposed to new agreements,
and consequently held that the covenant not to compete was void and
unenforceable. 14
Allegra is especially interesting because the court expressly recognized that
both Texas law (where the franchisee was located) and Minnesota law (where the
original 1984 franchisor was based) would have enforced the covenant not to
compete. 15 It was only the mid-term change of the choice of law provision to
Michigan law that rendered the covenant unenforceable. 16 Allegra demonstrates
the potentially crucial impact of choice of law in general, as well as its
importance in the franchise context in particular. Like the franchise at issue in
Allegra, franchisee-franchisor relationships are often long-term, complex
relationships, and the impact of choice of law on all aspects of the relationship
may not always be immediately apparent. Allegra highlights the potential hidden
perils of changing choice of law in the middle of a franchise relationship.
B. ARBITRATION
Franchise agreements containing arbitration provisions often have explicit
exceptions to the arbitration requirement for specific causes of action, such as
for injunctive relief. In Dickey’s Barbecue Restaurants, Inc. v. Mathieu, the
Northern District of Texas analyzed these exceptions.17 In this case, the
franchisor, Dickey’s Barbecue, brought suit against its franchisee, Mathieu.18
Dickey’s terminated Mathieu for breaches of the franchise agreement and
brought claims for declaratory relief (seeking a declaration of breach of the
7. Id. at *2.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *3.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at *4.
15. Id. at *3.
16. Id.
17. Dickey’s Barbecue Restaurants, Inc. v. Mathieu, No. 3:12-CV-5119-G, 2013 WL 5268976
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2013).
18. Id. at *2.
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franchise agreement), injunctive relief (to prevent Mathieu from operating the
restaurant), breach of contract (relating to the franchise agreement), and
fraudulent inducement (relating to an aborted agreement by Mathieu to sell the
restaurant to Dickey’s). 19 Mathieu moved to dismiss or stay based on the
arbitration provision in the franchise agreement. 20
The court first examined whether Dickey’s claims were subject to the
franchise agreement’s arbitration provision because the franchise agreement
“does not contain a clear indication that the parties intended for an arbitrator to
decide the issue of arbitrability.” 21 Dickey’s primary argument was that, although
the franchise agreement contained a very broad arbitration provision, its claims
fell under the exceptions in the provision for injunctions and actions for
“monies owed.” 22
Turning to Dickey’s claims, the court held that the declaratory judgment
claim must be submitted to arbitration because “[a] declaratory judgment is, by
definition, not a claim for monies owed.” 23 However, Dickey’s injunction
request was not subject to arbitration because of the explicit exception in the
franchise agreement’s arbitration provision for actions for injunctive relief.24
Here, Mathieu argued that the action for an injunction was moot because he
was no longer operating the restaurant and was willing to represent to the court
that he would not do so in the future.25 The court noted, however, that a “mere
disclaimer of intention to revive the wrongful conduct,” although relevant in
determining whether an injunction would be appropriate, did not moot
Dickey’s request for injunctive relief. 26
The court then analyzed Dickey’s breach of contract and fraudulent
inducement claims. 27 Dickey’s breach of contract claims involved failure to meet
system standards, as well as failure to pay past due royalties, and Dickey’s sought
future royalties for premature termination of the franchise agreement. 28 The
court held that most of Dickey’s breach of contract claims would clearly be
subject to arbitration, noting that the exception for an action for “monies owed”
did not equate to “damages,” and that lost future royalties were a form of
damages, not monies owed. 29 The court stated that Dickey’s claim for past due
royalties would fall under the exception to arbitration; however, because “claims
that are factually intertwined with arbitrable claims must be arbitrated,” and
because the court could not “conclude with positive assurance that Dickey’s
breach of contract claim regarding past due payments is not at least factually
intertwined with arbitrable claims,” all of the breach of contract claims should
19.
20.
21.
(1986)).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id.
Id.
Id. at *3 (citing AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7–8.
Id.
Id. at *8 (citing U.S. v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
Id. at *9.
Id. at *8–9.
Id.
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be submitted to arbitration. 30 Finally, the court concluded that Dickey’s
fraudulent inducement claim must be arbitrated. 31
Arbitration provisions are relatively common in franchise agreements. The
exceptions to arbitration at issue in Dickey’s, for actions for monies owed and for
injunctive relief, are also common. Dickey’s is an example of a court analyzing
these exceptions in the context of a wide variety of claims. Of note is the
discussion on the breach of contract claim. Even though a portion of that claim
was an action for “monies owed” that would fall under an exception to
arbitration, because Dickey’s also included claims for damages resulting from
breaches of system standards and for premature termination, the court
concluded that all of the breach of contract claims must be arbitrated.32
C. DISCOVERY
Although all franchise cases are unique, certain issues tend to arise on a
regular basis in franchise litigation. In particular, disputes over the proper scope
of discovery, especially involving third-party franchisees or aspects of the
franchise system not directly at issue, are common in franchise cases. The case
Meltzer/Austin Rest. Corp. v. Benihana Nat’l Corp. illustrates several of these types
of disputes. 33 Meltzer involved claims by a Benihana franchisee, Meltzer, that
Benihana unfairly applied its system standards to the franchisee’s restaurants
and misrepresented facts “regarding its intent to enter into a new franchise
agreement.” 34 The parties had a number of disputes over discovery issues that
are resolved in the Meltzer opinion; the discussion below highlights the more
notable rulings.
The first dispute involved franchise agreements. Meltzer requested that
Benihana produce every franchise agreement that Benihana had executed for
the past ten years on the theory that Benihana made misrepresentations that it
would enter into a new franchise agreement with Meltzer on terms at least as
good as other franchisees.35 The court held that this request was overbroad
because Meltzer could only identify two particular franchisees named by
Benihana in its alleged misrepresentations.36 The court held that Meltzer was
entitled to franchise agreements with these specific franchisees; however, it
limited the request to the specific period of time during which the
misrepresentations were allegedly made.37
Meltzer also sought documents showing the reasoning behind Benihana’s
decision to change certain system standards that were relevant to the plaintiff’s

30. Id. at *9 (citing Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. 1992)).
31. Id.
32. See id. at *8–9.
33. Meltzer/Austin Rest. Corp. v. Benihana Nat’l Corp., No. A-11-CV-542-LY-AWA, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41838 (W.D. Tex. March 26, 2013). Haynes and Boone, LLP serves as counsel for
Benihana National Corporation in this matter.
34. Id. at *7–8.
35. Id. at *6–7.
36. Id. at *11.
37. Id. at *11–12.
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defaults. 38 The court held that, although the system standards themselves were
relevant, the reasoning behind the changes was not. 39 The court allowed Meltzer
discovery of Benihana’s standards in general but limited this discovery to the
time frame of the events giving rise to the suit. 40
The primary discovery dispute in Meltzer was over information on the
performance of the plaintiff’s franchises. 41 Meltzer requested “information
related to the value of Meltzer’s franchises in Austin and San Antonio, financial
reports of Benihana’s franchise and corporate stores, and inspection and
consulting reports regarding Meltzer’s Benihana franchises as well as other
Benihana franchises and corporate stores.” 42 Meltzer argued that, because New
York law applied to the franchise agreements, the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing found in New York law meant that Benihana’s disparate
treatment of other franchisees was discoverable. 43 Benihana argued that the
implied covenant was limited to the terms of the agreements; therefore,
information concerning other franchisees was not discoverable. 44 Applying New
York law, the court held that the exercise of discretion contemplated by the
franchise agreement in applying system standards meant that Benihana’s
treatment of other franchisees could be relevant. 45 The court limited Meltzer’s
requests, however, noting that financial information regarding other franchisees
was not relevant because Meltzer’s restaurants were not defaulted for financial
performance reasons, and that consulting reports and mystery shopper reports
would only need to be produced for restaurants that had been found in
violation of the relevant system standards. 46
Like the Meltzer plaintiff, franchisees often want to discover information
about other franchisees to show disparate treatment, while franchisors, for a
number of reasons, do not generally want to reveal non-public information
concerning their relationship with other franchisees. Although a portion of the
Meltzer court’s opinion applied New York law to reach its holding, the opinion
provides a guide as to how a court may analyze requests for information
concerning third-party franchisees in discovery.
III. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION, AND
NONRENEWAL
A. MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER STATUTE
In 2013, the Texas Legislature amended the laws regulating motor vehicle

38. Id. at *14–16.
39. Id. at *16–17 (“Whether the dinnerware supplied by Edward Don & Company is actually
of lesser quality, as Meltzer alleges, is irrelevant to the whether Meltzer complied with Benihana’s
changed requirement regarding its standard dinnerware.”).
40. Id. at *18–19.
41. See id. at *23.
42. Id. at *23–24.
43. Id. at *25.
44. Id. at *25–26.
45. Id. at *26–32.
46. Id. at *34–38.
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dealers, manufacturers, and distributors. 47 Specifically, Texas Senate Bill 854
prohibits a franchisor from coercing or attempting to coerce a franchisee to
relocate an existing dealership to property that is subject to a specific use
agreement that limits the franchisee’s ability to add a line-make or prohibits the
sale or sublease of the property for a purpose other than the operation of a
dealership. 48
B. TERMINATION AND NONRENEWAL
In Mailing & Shipping Systems, Inc. v. Neopost USA, Inc., the parties disputed the
length of the notice period—thirty days or ninety days—required for Neopost to
terminate its dealership agreement with Mailing and Shipping Systems (Mailing
& Shipping). 49 Mailing & Shipping had previously entered into a dealership
agreement with Neopost’s predecessor-in-interest “to sell, install, and maintain
[Neopost’s] postage meters and mailing machines [in parts of] Texas and New
Mexico.” 50 The terms of the dealership agreement, however, were not
maintained in a single document, but arose through course of dealing and
documents, including dealer policy manuals, that were exchanged during the
parties’ twenty-four-year business relationship.51
After Mailing & Shipping failed to meet its assigned sales quotas, Neopost
notified Mailing & Shipping of the termination of the dealership agreement
effective in fifty days. 52 Thereafter, Mailing & Shipping sued Neopost for breach
of contract for terminating the dealership agreement without providing
adequate notice. 53 In the lawsuit, Mailing & Shipping argued Neopost was
required to give ninety days’ notice pursuant to the 2011 Dealer Policy Manual,
which stated: “Except as otherwise provided in a written agreement with Dealer,
[Neopost] shall give [Mailing & Shipping] ninety (90) days prior written notice
of intent to terminate . . . .” 54 Neopost, on the other hand, argued that a 1988
letter between Mailing & Shipping and Neopost’s predecessor, which stated that
the “arrangement [was] subject to termination by [Neopost] upon 30 days
written notice,” set a shorter notice period. 55
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, applying Texas law,
found that the letter was an “agreement” for purposes of the exception to the
ninety-day notice provision in the 2011 Dealer Policy Manual because the letter
constituted a “manifestation of mutual assent.” 56 Even though the letter lacked
Mailing & Shipping’s signature, statements in the letter, such as “[w]e are
pleased that your company will be representing us and we appreciate your
47. Act of May 22, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1338, § 1, sec. 2301.483, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 3550, 3551 (West).
48. Id.
49. Mailing & Shipping Sys., Inc. v. Neopost USA, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 2d 879, 884 (W.D. Tex.
2013).
50. Id. at 880.
51. Id. at 880–81.
52. Id. at 882.
53. Id. at 883.
54. Id. at 885.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 885–86.
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confidence in our products,” and the parties’ subsequent conduct led the court
to find that the letter was a written agreement falling within the ninety-day
notice period exception. 57 The court granted Neopost summary judgment on
Mailing & Shipping’s claim for breach of the dealership agreement by providing
insufficient notice of termination. 58 This case serves as an excellent reminder, in
light of the long-term nature of the typical franchise relationship, of how the
parties’ obligations to each other may be amended or modified over multiple
“agreements.”
Mailing & Shipping Systems is also notable in that Mailing & Shipping argued
that a duty of good faith and fair dealing applied to the contract. 59 The court
observed that this duty “does not exist in all contractual relationships” in Texas,
and “the Texas Supreme Court has explicitly ‘declined to extend this commonlaw duty to all franchise agreements.’” 60 However, the court did note that “the
duty of good faith and fair dealing . . . may apply to [a] ‘distributorship
agreement’ where the sale of goods is ‘the dominant factor or essence’ in such a
contract,” pursuant to section 1.304 of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code. 61 The court did not determine whether the duty applied in this
dealership case because it found that even if the duty applied, there was no
evidence of a violation. 62 Because the defendant did not breach any contractual
duty, the defendant had no additional obligations pursuant to a duty of good
faith and fair dealing. 63 This case affirms that even if a plaintiff convinces a
court that the statutory duty of good faith found in the Texas Business and
Commerce Code applies, the plaintiff will still need to tie it to the violation of a
specific contractual obligation.
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas rendered two
decisions involving Choice Hotels International concerning the unauthorized
use of trademarks.
In Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Bhakta, Choice Hotels International, Inc. (Choice
Hotels) filed a motion for summary judgment to determine that it had properly
terminated a franchise agreement with its franchisee, JBI, and that the
franchisee and its agent, Bhakta, violated Choice Hotels’ rights under the
Lanham Act and Texas common law by continuing to use Choice Hotels’
trademarks after termination. 64 After Choice Hotels terminated the franchise
agreement due to the condition of the hotel, the franchisee and Bhakta
continued to use the trademarks. 65 The court granted Choice Hotels’ motion for
57. Id. at 886.
58. Id. at 887.
59. Id. at 888.
60. Id. at 889 (emphasis added).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Bhakta, No. 2:11-CV-00411, 2013 WL 1403526, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 5, 2013).
65. See id.
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summary judgment. 66
The Bhakta court reiterated that to succeed on a claim of trademark
infringement and false designation of origin or unfair competition, Choice
Hotels had to show “(1) it possesse[d] a legally protectable mark; and (2) JBI and
Bhakta used the same or similar marks in commerce in a manner likely to
confuse potential customers as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
JBI/Bhakta with [Choice Hotels].” 67 The “likelihood-of-confusion test” was
satisfied as a matter of law because the exact (as opposed to similar) marks were
used after termination of the franchise agreement, and there was also
“uncontroverted evidence of actual confusion.” 68 The actual confusion was
shown by JBI customers’ complaints to Choice Hotels about the hotel during
the time of the unauthorized use of the marks, and JBI customers contacting
Choice Hotels with demands for rewards credits for their stays in the hotel. 69
Moreover, proof of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act was proof of
infringement under Texas common law, and the same evidence that would
support the Lanham Act infringement claim also supported a Texas common
law claim of unfair competition. 70
Although the court noted that the defendants in Bhakta did not properly
plead the affirmative defense of acquiescence, the court nonetheless examined it
and determined that it would not have saved the defendants even if they had
properly raised it.71 The court explained that acquiescence “is an equitable
defense that requires proof that: (1) [Choice Hotels] knew or should have
known of JBI and Bhakta’s continued use of the trademark; (2) [Choice Hotels]
made implicit or explicit assurances to JBI and Bhakta that use was permitted;
and (3) JBI and Bhakta relied on the assurances.” 72 The court examined the
evidence in the case and determined that the second element of the
acquiescence defense—that the franchisor made assurances—was not satisfied. 73
The email correspondence relied upon by the defendants was not inconsistent
with Choice Hotels’ termination of the franchise agreement and did not
amount to an assurance by Choice Hotels that use of the trademarks was
permitted. 74 The court also found that it was “important to note” that the
defense was not available in any case because defendants had received a cease
and desist letter and continued to engage in the infringing activity. 75 The court
also noted that defendants “[r]emarkably” continued the infringing activity after
the lawsuit was filed. 76 This case reinforces the importance of the language

66. Id.
67. Id. at *3 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a); Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc.,
519 F.3d 321, 329 (5th Cir. 2008); and Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. Supp. 2d 667, 674
(W.D. Tex. 2008)).
68. Id. at *1, *3.
69. Id. at *3
70. Id. at *4.
71. Id. at *5.
72. Id. at *4.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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contained in cease and desist notices, particularly when the franchisee may have
grounds for an acquiescence defense.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted in part
and denied in part another motion for summary judgment in a different case
involving Choice Hotels during this survey period: Choice Hotels International,
Inc. v. Patel.77 Like the Bhakta case, Patel involved claims of trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act and Texas common law relating to the
unauthorized use of Choice Hotels’ trademarks after Choice Hotels terminated
a franchise agreement with a husband and wife. 78 In the Patel case, Choice
Hotels terminated the franchise pursuant to the terms of the agreement and
instructed the franchisee to stop using the Choice Hotels marks after the date of
termination. 79
As in Bhakta, the Patel court noted that all four of Choice Hotels’ causes of
action—“trademark infringement under the Lanham Act; false designation of
origin under the Lanham Act; trademark infringement under Texas common
law; and unfair competition under Texas common law”—could be determined
with one inquiry because a determination of trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act would supply a basis for liability for all causes of action.80
There was undisputed evidence that Mr. Patel continued to use the marks in
commerce after termination by not properly removing or covering the exterior
signs, continuing to print the Comfort Inn logo on customer receipts, and not
removing a Wi-Fi message saying “Welcome to the Comfort Inn.” 81 As noted
earlier, the use of exact marks—which Mr. Patel did in this case—creates a
presumption of confusion that makes an analysis of the nondispositive “digits of
confusion” that the Fifth Circuit considers to determine whether a likelihood of
confusion exists unnecessary. 82 The “digits of confusion” include:
(1) strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) similarity of design between the
marks; (3) similarity of the products; (4) identity of retail outlets and
purchasers; (5) similarity of advertising media used; (6) the defendants’
intent; (7) actual confusion; and (8) degree of care exercised by potential
purchasers. 83
Despite Mr. Patel’s use of Choice Hotels’ exact marks, the court still
examined the digits of confusion test “for the sake of completeness.” 84 The
application of that test to the facts of the case—each of which either favored
Choice Hotels or did not decisively favor either party—indicated that there was
“no factual dispute regarding a likelihood of confusion.” 85

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
2008)).
84.
85.

Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Patel, 940 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
See id. at 535–36, 538.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 538 (citations omitted).
Id. at 536–37, 539–40.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 540 (quoting Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 329 (5th Cir.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 540–41.
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Following that analysis, the court found that there was “no genuine dispute
that Mr. Patel used Choice Hotels’ legally protected marks in commerce without
Choice Hotels’ consent and that such use was likely to cause confusion” and,
therefore, granted summary judgment under all four causes of action. 86 Because
a fact issue remained regarding whether Mrs. Patel “actively and knowingly
caused the infringement” since her involvement with the operation of the hotel
at the time in question was in dispute, the court did not grant summary
judgment with respect to her. 87
Taken together, the Bhakta and Patel cases are examples of federal courts
continuing to strictly enforce the Lanham Act against franchisees who continue
to operate their franchises post-termination.
V. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. CONTRACT ISSUES
Gold’s Gym Franchising LLC v. Brewer is a case from the Texas Court of
Appeals in Dallas that involved issues relating to the enforceability of Gold’s
Gym franchise and guaranty agreements. 88 In Gold’s Gym, a corporation named
GGNYC 2 entered into a franchise agreement in 2005 with Gold’s Gym
Franchising, LLC (Gold’s Gym), Exhibit B of which was a “Full Continuing
Guaranty” that provided for personal liability for each of the GGNYC 2
shareholders. 89 The guaranty was purportedly signed by all three shareholders,
although one of them, Brewer, contended that his signature was forged. 90
GGNYC 2 and Gold’s Gym later entered into another franchise agreement in
2008 that superseded the 2005 franchise agreement; Exhibit B to the 2008
agreement also contained a guaranty on which Brewer’s signature was, again,
allegedly forged. 91
Gold’s Gym sued Brewer and other involved parties based on, inter alia,
breach of the franchise agreement and guaranties. 92 Brewer moved for summary
judgment.93 With respect to the breach-of-guaranty claims, Brewer’s “motion
focused on the first element, the existence and ownership of the guaranty
contract.” 94 Addressing the forgery allegation, the court of appeals determined
that conflicting expert testimony created a fact issue as to whether the signatures
on the guaranties were forged. 95 Additionally, the court explained that, if valid,
the 2005 guaranty agreement would continue to apply to the 2008 franchise
86. Id. at 541.
87. Id. at 541–42.
88. Gold’s Gym Franchising LLC v. Brewer, 400 S.W.3d 156, 159 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013,
no pet.).
89. Id. at 158.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 159.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 161; see also id. at 162 (citing Beverick v. Koch Power, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 145, 150
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)) (reciting the elements of a cause of action for
breach of contract).
95. Id. at 161.
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agreement because it stated on its face that it “shall apply to . . . any license or
franchise agreements between the parties replacing the Agreement.” 96 The court
affirmed prior case law stating that a guarantor “will not be held to the
obligations beyond his agreement”; however, that legal principle did not help
Brewer in this situation because the continuing applicability of the guaranty was
part of the terms of the guaranty when it was purportedly signed. 97 The court of
appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of Brewer on Gold’s Gym’s claims
for breach of the guaranties. 98
Gold’s Gym also claimed that even if there had been a forgery on the
guaranties, Brewer had ratified the franchise agreements and the guaranties by
his conduct.99 The court found that the trial court did not err in granting
Brewer summary judgment on this pleading. 100 With respect to the franchise
agreement claims, the court found that Gold’s Gym could not succeed on the
first element of a breach of contract claim against Brewer because GGNYC 2
was party to the franchise agreement with Gold’s Gym, not Brewer. 101 Although
there was evidence of Brewer acting in accordance with the terms of the
franchise agreement, Brewer’s actions did not amount to ratification of the
contract because “there can be no ratification of a contract by one who is not a
party to it unless the original contract purported to be in the name of, or for, the
person alleged to have ratified it.” 102 Even though the guaranty was incorporated
into the franchise agreement and Brewer was identified as a guarantor, Brewer
was not a party to the franchise agreement. 103 Brewer’s actions were taken as an
agent of GGYNC 2, not in his individual capacity. 104 There was also no
evidence that Brewer or the Trust ratified the allegedly forged guaranties by
performing under them. 105
Gold’s Gym is notable for its discussion of ratification and the impact of a
guarantee agreement. Franchise agreements are very often executed alongside
companion guaranty agreements, but in some cases the guaranty agreements
may not always be executed, or, as in this case, there could be a claim of forgery.
Gold’s Gym provides an analysis of a franchisor’s attempt to enforce a guaranty
agreement where the basic guaranty obligation is contested.
In Jackson v. Longagribusiness L.L.C., a franchisee brought a claim for
negligence against its franchisor when, after the termination of a franchise
agreement, farm equipment the franchisee had previously purchased, and which
the franchisor had not yet removed, was stolen from the franchisee’s property.106

96. Id. (alteration in original).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 162.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 162–63.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Huginnie v. Loyd, 483 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1972, writ ref’d
n.r.e.)).
103. Id. at 163.
104. Id. at 162.
105. Id. at 163.
106. Jackson v. Longagribusiness, L.L.C., No. 14-11-01073-CV, 2013 WL 84921, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 8, 2013, no pet.).
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The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District in Houston found the
franchisor owed the franchisee no duty separate from the contractual
requirements; any breach of a contractual duty would not support a tort claim of
negligence. 107 Testimony regarding common practices of the franchisor that
went beyond the terms of the contract was insufficient to give rise to a legal duty
in tort. 108 The defendant terminated the agreement pursuant to the terms of the
policy manual that was part of the dealership agreement and did not violate a
duty of good faith and fair dealing, if one existed at all. 109 Jackson is another
example affirming the critical importance of the franchise agreement to the
franchise relationship; attempts to impart legal duties to the parties outside of
the franchise agreement very rarely succeed.
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Calvasina v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust explored the issue of a
franchisor’s liability for the workplace injury of an employee at a franchisee’s
store. 110 Calvasina involved a worker in the tire section at a Wal-Mart store in
San Antonio, Texas, who was injured after falling from a platform on the upper
level of a tire rack system while performing his job. 111 The worker, Calvasina,
was employed by Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., who leased him to Wal-Mart Texas,
LLC (Wal-Mart Texas), the store at which he worked in San Antonio. 112 WalMart Texas operated according to a franchise agreement and lease with WalMart Store, Inc. (the Corporation). 113 Previously in the lawsuit, Calvasina had
succeeded in obtaining summary judgment that Wal-Mart Texas and the
Corporation were not Calvasina’s employers, and thus, workers’ compensation
was not the exclusive remedy for his injuries. 114 In light of that ruling, the
defendants filed another motion for summary judgment, arguing that because
they were not Calvasina’s employers, they owed Calvasina no duty for which
they could be liable for negligence. 115 The court disagreed with that broad
contention, but nonetheless analyzed the duties owed. 116 The court ultimately
denied the motion for summary judgment with respect to Wal-Mart Texas
because it found that Wal-Mart Texas may owe a duty to Calvasina as the
premises operator. 117 However, the court granted summary judgment to the
Corporation. 118
Calvasina argued that the Corporation had the right to control the security
and safety of the tire rack system and retained actual control over the policies
relating to the tire rack system; therefore, according to the Texas Supreme Court
107.
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115.
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117.
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Calvasina v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, 906 F. Supp. 2d 625 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
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Id. at 641.
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precedent in Exxon v. Tidwell, the Corporation “incurred a duty to keep the tire
rack safe for personnel.” 119 The court disagreed. The court looked to the
franchise agreement, which assigned responsibility for the store to Wal-Mart
Texas. 120 Although the Corporation could inspect the premises at any
reasonable time, could provide management assistance, and would promulgate
policies and protocol for the store, Wal-Mart Texas retained ultimate control. 121
The franchise agreement was silent with respect to the control of workplace
safety specifically, but assigned control of “operations and ‘health standards’ to
Wal-Mart Texas.” 122 The court noted that “[m]erely exercising or retaining a
general right to recommend a safe manner for the independent contractor’s
employees to perform their work is not enough to establish liability,” so the
franchise agreement, which did not give the Corporation control over the
“means, methods, or details of the work at Wal-Mart Texas,” did not give the
Corporation a contractual right to control workplace safety. 123 The court also
found that the Corporation’s safety protocols and programs did not show that
the Corporation had a general right to control workplace safety that would
create a duty to Calvasina. 124
Additionally, even though the franchise agreement required Wal-Mart Texas
to use the Corporation’s training materials, there was no evidence that the
Corporation was contractually responsible for providing training concerning the
tire rack or actually controlled providing that training. 125 The court explained
that “absent evidence that the Corporation knew that Wal-Mart Texas routinely
failed to train its employees and that the Corporation had a contractual right to
intervene to correct it, a contract requiring Wal-Mart Texas to conduct training
does not create liability for the Corporation if it did not.” 126 “To the extent the
Corporation retained supervisory control, there [was] no evidence that the
Corporation” specifically provided direction regarding the tire rack or knew of
unsafe methods being used to operate it. 127 With respect to the training
materials, the Corporation owed no duty other than to ensure that the training
materials did not increase the risk of harm, which they did not. 128
The Corporation did not have the requisite control over the tire rack to
create a duty. 129 There was no evidence that the Corporation required Wal-Mart
Texas to use the particular tire rack in question, or that the Corporation had the
right to control how it was installed. 130 The franchise agreement gave the duty to
maintain the tire rack to Wal-Mart Texas, and there was no evidence that WalMart Texas could only perform maintenance at the behest of the
119.
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Corporation. 131 Although Calvasina criticized the Corporation’s policy for being
vague and deficient, the court found no evidence that it increased the risk of
harm over no policy at all. 132 Also, there was no evidence that the Corporation
was aware in its supervisory capacity of instances of Wal-Mart Texas not
following the policy. 133
Calvasina finally argued that the Corporation negligently undertook
providing a safe working environment and was liable under the “Good
Samaritan Doctrine” examined in section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 134 The court found, however, that there was an inadequate demonstration
that the Corporation’s actions increased the risk of harm to Calvasina, or that it
took on more than a supervisory control with respect to the tire racks, and no
evidence that it negligently exercised that control. 135
Calvasina is an example of a court following the more modern trend in
vicarious liability as it relates to franchising. Although the Calvasina plaintiff
brought a direct liability claim of negligence against the franchisor, the opinion’s
analysis on whether the franchisor owed a duty to the plaintiff follows a
traditional vicarious liability analysis in the franchise context. 136 The court did
not fixate on the various contractual provisions designed to give the franchisor
control over its trademarks; rather, the court focused on which party actually
had control over the instrumentality at issue—in this case, training. 137 Calvasina
is an example of how (most) courts are recognizing, implicitly or explicitly, that
the franchising model presents a unique situation for a vicarious liability
analysis. 138
VI. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES—CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
In AdvoCare International, L.P. v. Ford, the Court of Appeals in Dallas
considered the scope of “consumer” protection under the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practice Act (DTPA). 139 The court found that former distributors
claiming the loss of their distributorships did not constitute “consumers” under
the DTPA.140 Because the claims related to the termination of the
distributorship instead of the goods or services acquired from AdvoCare, the
distributors could not recover damages as consumers or attorney’s fees as

131. Id. at 639–40.
132. Id. at 640.
133. Id. at 641.
134. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965)).
135. Id.
136. See id. at 631–32.
137. Id. at 637–38.
138. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Wolf & Aaron C. Schepler, Caught Between Scylla and Charybdis: Are
Franchisors Still Stuck Between the Rock of Non-Uniformity and the Hard Place of Vicarious Liability?, 33
FRANCHISE L.J. 195, 204 (2013).
139. AdvoCare International, L.P. v. Ford, No. 05-10-00590-CV, 2013 WL 505210, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 5, 2013, pet. denied).
140. Id.
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prevailing consumers under the DTPA for those claims. 141 Notably, the court
pointed out that the outcome may have been different had one of the
distributors established that it purchased a “franchise” instead of a wholly
intangible property right to sell AdvoCare products. 142
AdvoCare sells its products through distributors pursuant to distributorship
agreements subject to renewal. 143 Between 2003 and 2009, AdvoCare
terminated a number of distributorship agreements. 144 Several of the terminated
distributors brought suit alleging DTPA violations. 145 The distributors alleged
product defects, misrepresentations regarding the goods and services AdvoCare
provided, and failure to disclose information regarding the goods and
services. 146 The former distributors sought damages related to the value of their
lost businesses. 147 The trial court granted judgment for the distributors, and
AdvoCare appealed. 148
On appeal, the court focused on the definition of “consumer” under the
DTPA.149 There are two basic requirements to qualify as a “consumer”: (1) “the
person must have sought or acquired goods or services by purchase or lease,”
and (2) “the goods or services purchased or leased must form the basis of the
complaint.” 150 The court held that even if the former distributors could qualify
as consumers based on goods or services acquired, they could not meet the
second requirement. 151 The goods or services that the distributors acquired from
AdvoCare did not form the basis of their complaint; instead, the basis of their
complaint was the loss of their distributorships. 152 Because “[n]either the
termination nor the lost value [was] tied to any alleged defective product or
service,” the court held that the former distributors did not qualify as consumers
entitled to protection under the DTPA.153
The court also distinguished between relationships expressly excluded under
the DTPA—“relationships that convey wholly intangible property rights, such as
distributors and sales representatives”—from the purchase of a franchise. 154
Although a franchise is an intangible property right, it may still involve the
transfer of goods or services for purposes of the DTPA. 155 A franchisee may
qualify as a consumer where collateral services associated with the franchise
agreement are clearly an objective of the transaction and not merely incidental

141. Id.
142. See id.
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *2.
146. Id. at *3.
147. Id. at *4.
148. Id. at *1.
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151. See id. at *4.
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155. See id. (citing Fisher Controls Int’l, Inc. v. Gibbons, 911 S.W.2d 135, 138–39 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied)).
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to the performance of such a transaction. 156 In AdvoCare, the court pointed to
the following facts to distinguish the distributors’ agreement from that of a
qualifying franchise: “They paid a nominal fee, had the right to purchase
AdvoCare products at a discount, and to earn income through the multi-level
compensation plan based on sales volume.” 157 Because none of the former
distributors produced any evidence or made any argument that they purchased a
franchise instead of a wholly intangible property right—the right to sell
AdvoCare’s products—the court held that their claims failed as a matter of
law. 158 AdvoCare is another in a line of Texas cases discussing DTPA “consumer”
status in the context of a franchise relationship. The case reaffirms the principle
that a “franchisee” may indeed qualify as a consumer under the statute, but that
a pure distributor may not.
B. BANKRUPTCY
In Allegra Network, LLC v. Ruth (In re Ruth), discussed above for its choice of
law issues, the court determined that monetary damages stemming from the
violation of a noncompete constituted a “claim” that may be discharged in
bankruptcy. 159 In this case, the creditor franchisor alleged that the defendant
franchisees, Chapter 13 debtors, breached a covenant not to compete included
within their franchise agreement. As discussed above, the court found that the
covenant not to compete was unenforceable under Michigan law. 160 But the
court went on to analyze another issue: whether a creditor’s right to equitable
relief pursuant to a noncompete was a claim that was dischargeable in
bankruptcy. 161 The court noted that equitable remedies, such as specific
performance, are generally not dischargeable. 162 But “if state law makes
monetary damages available as an alternative to specific performance, then the
equitable relief sought constitutes a ‘claim’ dischargeable in bankruptcy.” 163 In
Allegra, the choice of law provision designated Michigan law as the governing law
for the franchise agreement. 164 Under Michigan law, monetary damages are
available as a remedy to compensate for the violation of a noncompete
agreement. 165 Accordingly, the court held that the breach of the covenant not to
compete gave rise to a “right of payment,” which constituted a claim subject to
discharge in bankruptcy. 166
This holding of Allegra emphasizes the importance of identifying applicable
state law governing a franchise agreement when evaluating whether a party’s
equitable remedy is incorporated into the concept of a “claim.” This is an
156. See id.
157. Id. at *5.
158. See id. at *14–15.
159. Allegra Network, LLC v. Ruth, Ch. 13 Case No. 10-50184, Adv. No. 10-5009, 2013 WL
139265, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2013).
160. See id. at *4.
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important holding to note in the franchise context given the frequency of
litigation over noncompete provisions contained in franchise agreements. If
monetary damages are available under state law, the equitable remedy sought is
subject to discharge in bankruptcy. 167 In such a situation, the bankruptcy
essentially erases the obligation to pay damages for violating a noncompete.
This, however, is not the result across all jurisdictions.168 Thus, it is essential for
a party to focus on the applicable law and the remedies available under that law
when addressing bankruptcy issues for franchisees and franchisors.
VII. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. LANHAM ACT AND DAMAGES: COMPENSATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
In the Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Bhakta case discussed above, the court
held that Choice Hotels International (Choice Hotels) was entitled to a
permanent injunction based on the franchisee’s continued use of Choice
Hotels’ trademarks after the termination of its franchise agreement. 169 The court
also awarded disgorgement of profits in the amount of $105,453.29.170 To reach
that number, the court allowed Choice Hotels to “pick and choose” the
transactions on which it sought to recover within the relevant time frame.171 The
court noted that “the owner of the intellectual property is not treated as a
‘partner’ subject to both profits and losses. . . . Instead, it is like a tort victim and
is permitted to pick and choose the transactions on which it will recover.”172
Thus, Choice Hotels properly claimed a right to recover the amounts reflected
in the defendant’s profitable months and disregarded the months in which the
business operated at a net loss. 173
In addition to lost profits, the court awarded lost royalties and additional
damages. 174 For lost royalties, the court awarded damages based on the agreed
percentage in the franchise agreement. 175 The plaintiff also sought treble
damages pursuant to the Lanham Act based on the former franchisee’s
continued use of the marks. 176 Based on Choice Hotels’ repeated warnings and
the termination procedures identified in the franchise agreement, the court
found that the defendants intentionally and knowingly continued to use the
trademarks. 177 Upon this finding, the court used its discretion and awarded
additional damages in the amount of $75,000. 178 The court, however, did not
167. See id. at *5.
168. See id. at *5 & n.31(citing Sheerin v. Davis (In re Davis), 3 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 1993)
(applying Texas law)).
169. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Bhakta, No. 2:11-CV-00411, 2013 WL 1403526, at *5 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 5, 2013).
170. Id. at *8.
171. Id. at *6.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See id. at *7.
175. Id.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2006).
177. See Bhakta, 2013 WL 1403526, at*8.
178. Id.
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think the case was “exceptional” as to warrant an award of attorney’s fees. 179
In Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Patel, also discussed above, Choice Hotels
was not as fortunate. 180 In that case, Choice Hotels sued two former franchisees
for their continued use of its trademarks after the termination of the franchise
agreement. 181 Similar to the Bhakta case, Choice Hotels sought lost profits, lost
royalties, and treble damages. 182 The court, however, found that certain
questions of fact precluded summary judgment on monetary damages. 183
In determining lost profit damages, the court utilized the following nonexhaustive factors as laid out by the Fifth Circuit:
(1) whether the defendant intended to confuse or deceive; (2) whether sales
have been diverted; (3) the adequacy of other remedies; (4) any
unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in asserting her rights; (5) the public
interest in making the conduct unprofitable[;] and (6) whether it is a case
of palming off.184
In Patel, the court found that the first three factors and the sixth factor
weighed against awarding lost profits. 185 The court found that there was a
genuine issue of material fact with regard to the first factor because the former
franchisee undertook “extensive efforts” to remove Choice Hotels’
trademarks. 186 Likewise, the court found that the former franchisee’s conduct
was “not the type of willful and egregious conduct” for which courts have
awarded lost profits. 187 As to the second factor, the court found that the
evidence left questions about whether the sales had been diverted. 188 With
regard to the third factor, the court found that a permanent injunction was
adequate relief. 189 And, finally, the sixth factor weighed against awarding relief
because there was no evidence of “palming off.” 190 Because issues of material
fact remained with respect to Choice Hotels’ requests for reasonable royalty
damages and treble damages, the court held that the evidence did not support
an award of lost profits at the summary judgment stage. 191
Bhakta and Patel are similar cases in many ways, but the outcome of the lost
profits analysis differs. The Bhakta court did not undertake the same six-factor
analysis the Patel court used. Had it done so, perhaps a question of fact would
have precluded summary judgment in that case, as well. Patel shows that even
when liability is established on summary judgment on a Lanham Act claim, a
179. Id.
180. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Patel, 940 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
181. Id. at 535.
182. Id. at 542.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 544 (quoting Seatrex, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Id. at 544–46.
186. See id. at 544–45.
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defendant may still raise fact questions with respect to damages.
B. ATTORNEY’S FEES
In Franlink, Inc. v. GJMS Unlimited, Inc., a franchisor that successfully obtained
a permanent injunction to enforce a reformed noncompetition agreement
against its former franchisee was not entitled to attorney’s fees. 192 After
obtaining a permanent injunction, the franchisor argued that it was entitled to
attorney’s fees under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 193 Section
38.001(8) provides that “[a] person may recover reasonable attorney’s fees from
an individual or corporation, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and
costs, if the claim is for . . . an oral or written contract.” 194 The court disagreed,
pointing to section 15.51(c) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. 195
Section 15.51, which governs remedies in actions to enforce noncompetes, only
provides for attorney’s fees in certain circumstances.196 The court found that the
legislature intended an award of attorney’s fees in a single circumstance relating
to noncompetition agreements: “In the context of a personal-services agreement,
attorney’s fees may be awarded to a promisor who satisfies certain evidentiary
requirements in defending against enforcement of an unreasonable
covenant.” 197 The court found that section 15.51(c) applied over the more
general Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section and did not
contemplate an award of attorney’s fees in a situation like the one in Franlink—
dealing with an unreasonable noncompete provision that had previously been
judicially reformed to cause the noncompete to be reasonable. 198 In such a case,
the court found that the legislature intended to limit the relief available to
injunctive relief. 199 Because attorney’s fees are not injunctive relief, the court
held that section 15.51(c) barred their recovery. 200 Franlink is an important
holding for franchise practitioners to note given the frequency of litigation over
noncompetition agreements found in and ancillary to franchise agreements.
C. INTEREST
In Tricon Energy Ltd. v. Vinmar International, Ltd., the Fifth Circuit addressed a
case of first impression: whether parties could contract for and arbitrators could
award a postjudgment rate other than the federal statutory rate. 201 The court
held that as a matter of contract interpretation, arbitrators could decide whether
a provision allowed them to set the postjudgment rate. 202 In Tricon itself,
192. Franlink, Inc. v. GJMS Unlimited, Inc., 401 S.W.3d 705, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).
193. Id. at 707.
194. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 38.001(8) (2008).
195. Franlink, 401 S.W.3d at 711–12.
196. See id. at 711.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 712.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Tricon Energy Ltd. v. Vinmar Int’l, Ltd., 718 F.3d 448, 456 (5th Cir. 2013).
202. See id. at 458.
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however, the arbitrators awarded “post-award interest” instead of postjudgment
interest. 203 The court found that this distinction dictated the result in this
case. 204 Because it was unclear, the court held that the postjudgment interest
should be based on the federal rate, not the rate that the arbitrators
determined. 205 Thus, in future cases, it seems that parties may contract at
alternative interest rates provided that the arbitrators clearly award
“postjudgment” interest and provided that the matter is ultimately an issue of
contract interpretation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This survey period saw franchise and distribution cases covering a range of
subject matter very familiar to franchise attorneys.
Among the procedural cases, the Allegra Network, LLC v. Ruth case on choice
of law and the Meltzer/Austin Restaurant Corp. v. Benihana National Corp. case on
breadth of discovery are of particular note. Although choice of law is often
something of an afterthought, the Allegra decision should dispel any notion that
it is inconsequential. The modification of applicable law in the middle of the
franchisee’s term in that case was dispositive on the enforceability of the
franchise agreement’s noncompete provision. 206 Not only is this case an
important reminder for litigators to be mindful of the impact of choice of law, it
is important for transactional attorneys to be mindful of the potential
consequences of changing choice of law mid-term. And the Meltzer case is
particularly significant in the discovery context. Franchisees often seek discovery
concerning other, non-party franchisees in litigation for a variety of reasons, and
franchisors often seek to shield this information. Meltzer analyzes these types of
discovery requests in several contexts, and it could be useful to a future court
analyzing these same issues.
There were few developments in the franchise relationship, termination, and
nonrenewal front, although the Texas legislature once again amended the motor
vehicle dealer statute, albeit in a relatively minor way. The Mailing & Shipping
Systems, Inc. v. Neopost USA, Inc. case highlights the type of contract-related issues
that may come up in a long-term franchise relationship with multiple
agreements, amendments, or modifications arising between the parties, and it
also contains a rare analysis of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the
context of a Texas contract. 207
Two Choice Hotels International decisions, Choice Hotels International, Inc. v.
Bhakta and Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Patel, highlight the intellectualproperty-related developments. Both cases involved a franchisee continuing to
use trademarks after termination of its franchise agreement, and both arose in
the summary judgment context. Bhakta contains an analysis of the
203. See id. at 460.
204. See id.
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206. Allegra Network, LLC v. Ruth, Ch. 13 Case No. 10-50184, Adv. No. 10-5009, 2013 WL
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“acquiescence” defense that many franchisees may be tempted to assert when a
franchisor does not immediately bring suit after termination. 208 Patel represents
a relatively straightforward example of a court strictly enforcing the Lanham Act
against a franchisee with no active trademark licenses, at least as to liability. 209
As for common law claims, the Gold’s Gym Franchising LLC v. Brewer case
highlights issues that may arise when a franchisor attempts to enforce a guaranty
agreement. 210 Perhaps the most notable common law case this survey period was
Calvasina v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, which analyzed a vicariousliability-like claim against a franchisor based upon premises liability. The case is
significant for franchisors in that the court examined the franchise agreement
and all the ways the franchisor could “control” the franchisee by establishing
standards, but it still found no liability for the franchisor because the actual
workplace was out of the franchisor’s control. 211
In the category of statutory claims, AdvoCare International, L.P. v. Ford is
notable for affirming that a pure distributorship arrangement is not likely to give
rise to “consumer” status under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, while a
traditional “franchise” relationship might. 212
Finally, in remedies, the two Choice Hotels International decisions
demonstrate that, while an injunction may be relatively easy to obtain based
upon a finding of liability under the Lanham Act, monetary damages could be
more difficult to sufficiently prove at the summary judgment stage. The Bhakta
court awarded monetary damages on summary judgment, but the Patel court
conducted a more in-depth analysis and found fact issues that precluded
summary judgment, demonstrating that damages should never be taken for
granted, even if liability has been determined. 213 And, although a relatively
minor point, the Franlink, Inc. v. GJMS Unlimited, Inc. case holds that attorneys’
fees may not be recoverable if the only other remedy awarded is an injunction
based on a noncompetition agreement. 214
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